2016 Applied Research Conference: Video plenary sessions and conference papers

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[Music]
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[Applause] in retrospect
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[Music]
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we're very excited
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you really need to find way [Music]
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[Applause] here in Prague about one of my favorite
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targets I have to say that when I started out I would have felt it as an
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organizational psychologist I would have felt quite embarrassed at the idea of
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promoting individuals to marking for themselves because I probably caller background and the notion that we may be
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bargain collectively our interests are collected that's really fundamental difficult how I was raised and to some
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extent still believe is true is I think the evidence supports the value of
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collective bargaining for the quality of deployment relationships on the other hand institutionally what has changed
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and what wasn't my childhood at the same time we know a lot more about who leaves
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and their roles and organizations and even better ways of the more traditional
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employment relationship in either syncretic Diesel's sisters and they
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existed we need shops and not even shops and they exist in the environment but
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not employers and randomly giant slab of employers and all sorts of other qualitative employers
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our so about it you see credit deals what they are and how big a work for the
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individual employee you who has such a deal the co-workers who by definition
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now has something may not be quite as an event which potentially as the person
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was the deal and the organization in which the deal is with whom the deal is
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made so what's an ideal so the in a syncretic deal many that defines three
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Turner's for you so we can talk about what the research tells us about the effective employee bargaining on the
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quality of employment relationship that well being with people and what happens in the organization in the aftermath so
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the agency crack deal is so specific turner terms of employment that an
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employee negotiate that an employer authorizes and agrees to because key
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thing is it's a specific term employment ago she aided by the employee could be initiated by the worker or the
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supervisor or by a charter that is part of something which often call the
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compensation wonderful what's a compensation bubble well that's all of benefits and rewards intrinsic and
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extrinsic that are part of the employment relationship and my deals are
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part of a larger exchange that is made between a person in the organization so
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Compensation Fund was kind of allergy it's a whole nine yards it's the
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whole to be using yards anymore but I can't do football in metric so okay and
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the last issue is once I do that have our conversation it is the psychological
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contract so what's a psychological contract psychological contracts are beliefs that an individual the worker
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supervisor the employer holes with regard to the mutual obligations in the
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employment relations are so an individual's belief about what they owe and our own in return and ideals these
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videos Socratic deals have an impact on the psychological contract to wit they
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actually introduce potentially new obligations to the psychological
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contract either the part of the employer or the employee sometimes even both so
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having said that up maybe some examples in a syncretic EDC credit deal that
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exists that people with seniority have
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first been very longer or more trusted have standing in the organization and so
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does that it's quite common for benefits with the same job title as a junior worker doing very different tasks having
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different notions of what constitutes that are appropriate powering their duties their responsibilities than an
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origin your counterparts and this phenomena has been with us probably from time immemorial but in part because
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veterans are in a position to ask for things yeah quite easily rented because
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of their standard stars get to customize people who are new to the organization is high performers very often are found
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they have more flexibility in their work arrangements not only are they perhaps better compensated but also more likely
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to be granted their exceptions with regard to hours and what they do and when they do what they do a compared to
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be average or more typical employee one of the ways in which I first started to
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see idiosyncratic deals so special arrangements that an individual had argued before was when I started looking
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at what happened after people had the experience of having their psychological contract violated so if an employee and
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come when to complain because they had promised him or her one of the byproducts of that many cases
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much lonely wouldn't give me a promotion but we worked it out so I would get my preferred assignment with regard to the
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clients so that I could work on the skills in trying to work that I wanted to do and prefer to do kind of as a
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substitute or a remedy for the promotion that didn't come and that's quite a
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common usually of Socratic meals I found a new field last issue what our ideals
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to great simple um I consider them to be kind of you and in the in the words of
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the old friendship effort the gifts well time so that idea that when somebody has
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done something special in the organization they finish their risky assignment a tough assignment weird
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multiple weekends to deliver on something important employee may be in a
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better position to ask for anything granted something that he or she prefers
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what's the idea of the tiny rewards that really are customized the particular
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circumstance individual finds herself in all these kind of the normal Evansville of
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employment relationship but situations in which an individual is bargaining for
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something different than what their peers have might well mean with a positive response one of the things
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that's very important we're talking about in a syncretic deals in this I have to remember to make this chart and
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clear as I take it for granted sometimes visits I've worked I mean it might kill us for a while but I I realized that
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lots of times when we talk about it using credit deals they can look like
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we're sound like things we could call shady deals the kinds of employment
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relationships and exceptions that are a lot less laudatory and a lot less benign and a lot less
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likely for co-workers to say that's a reasonable thing to have granted this
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other person so I want to differentiate ideals from to other kinds of
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not-so-nice special arrangements that individuals might get and so we're going
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to call those other to use preferential treatment or favoritism and the other
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one unauthorized conduct or [Music] so using credit deals come about because
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things that employees want and they can't necessarily grant themselves I can give me the papers on my own unless I
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steal from the dill it's hard to change my job title at least formally unless I
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get HR and my boss to sign off on it so any Socratic deals occur as a
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function of negotiation the basis for them is who whatever reason they were
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the employer values this person and is willing to give them some special
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accommodation or perfect the purpose of the goal of it is to benefit the worker and the firm and then that's the
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intended outcome is something the mutual mean let's contrast that with a shady
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deal so first shady deal is preferential treatment or favoritism so so-and-so bargains are someone so is
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able to let's say show up when he or she wants to and not get written up and
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complaint filed by the Box happen it turns out this person's the boss's
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sister and walk well that's not quite an ideal first because it wasn't the
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negotiation based on the value of the person of the organization it was a per
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the person is tainted because they know they can get away with it because they're somebody with an in this case to
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the boss could be the you know the brother-in-law of the owners that so preferential treatment is when
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the basis of that special arrangement is a relationship not with value to the
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organization a third class of deals that's not to be confused or second class a deal not to be confused with an
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amide deal is the unauthorized conduct or rule-breaking category and so this
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would be a circumstance in which the person who benefits from this special arrangement is the employee but
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everybody else loses a good example of that would be somebody who well they
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work the grave shift the night shift in a store and they're kind of bored it's a
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you know kind of rotten find that they would have paid enough of you to be working these late hours so what do they
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do is in the store maybe they drink some of the chocolate milk that's into them in the dairy case because well you know
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they're hungry and just a little bit of pilfering here maybe they take some cigarettes and take them home again
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you are a shrink but they're breaking the rules in order to benefit themselves and maybe the boss tolerates because
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it's really hard to get good help on the grave shift wink wink but though it's kind of understood as
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it's going on that's not an IEP like it's not negotiated B it's not a benefit
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in any kind of sustainable way to the employer and certainly not something
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that co-workers looking on would say gee that's kind of a practice your honor continue so I guess occupy a special
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space in the exchange relationship as a function of negotiation as a function of
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their basis the value of the worker the firm the quality of employment relationship and for the prospect the
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possibility something we want to take special pains to ensure because there's
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a potential for benefiting employee and the organization is something lacking
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with the other two kinds of exceptions but sometimes these things overlap a little bit and it's because of that
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overlap that kind of blurry boundary I'm going to try to be a little bit more
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click clear-cut and not let too much drift happen in my research and the
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thinking about it usually Reddick deals because we don't want to promote rule breaking or
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because both of those foster an environment of injustice and unfairness
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in the organization and as our last presenter did a very good job of conveying we have plenty of injustice
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already we don't need to make it worse so let's think about where my heels fit the context of the broader employment
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relationship or if you will the broader compensation bundle of all that good stuff that comes to us as a function of
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being part of an organization being employed by them so how many of you have
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a background or interest in compensation okay so we got a lot of people with
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compensation expertise in the room that's very important so you think about the issue then a good bit of our
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attention towards compensation programs and efforts is focused on the
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distinction between standardized available in every money and position base given to people who are have
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different kinds of roles or company different kinds of labor markets and we work very hard to certain rationalize
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the basis of pay systems so that there's a standard basis that that comes to
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people from membership there's returns have come to people as a function of the roles they play and their market value
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but we're a lot less attention goes as to the idiosyncratic individual bargain
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for unique to the person role in that compensation bundle so thinking about
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those were the big issues in understanding the psychology of ideals
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is the ratio or relationship between ideals and the other set of things that
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it's cheese with employees as a function of their employment relationship so given context were standardized
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conditions of employment and benefits and supports are made available to all
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one of the messages in that psychologically to people is that we in the organization of the same a broad
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basis of supports and whatnot have a common trait and the common identification with the employer
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position based rewards signal to us our status and kind of the value of our role
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of our contribution but if we have lots of standardized rewards and very few
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idiosyncratic the decision based rewards status differences are downplaying the organization on the other hand in
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organizations that offer very little as a function of membership and not so much
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as a function of positional contributions and you get it because you'll argue for it that's a situation
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in which employees don't have much of a shared sense of rewards and the benefits
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in common and that their membership is of collectively a valid clearly from
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looking at these just my little picture diagrams of different kinds of funnels you might begin to think about that I
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hear that she's having ideals has the large basis on which people got their benefits
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rewards probably isn't the great thing because it might you know the basic to
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children collaboration and identification of the broader organization especially if we're
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employed more than one person and that is kind of the idea what you want to be thinking about what the ideal means in
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the context of the larger employment relationship people are targeted so when you think about your secret deals the
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kinds of things people to negotiate think broadly is in my field research I
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have to say I haven't discovered ideals made on practically everything now some
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of the drivers variety Turner's in which ideals are negotiated but include things that are related to advancement career
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opportunity they're having a visible job assignment people negotiate for that people negotiate for job content
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workload to parts of the job or interesting to them offloading stuff they don't like to do as much certainly
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the issue of flexibility and hours or taking sabbaticals and leaves of absence coming into play so people negotiate on
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time and there are plenty of examples of it using credit Beatles based on hey
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I'll tell you about that in a little bit but these are the garden variety of things we come across stuff like oh yeah
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there was the guy in Switzerland who negotiated to that the company would pay
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to move his mrs. horse for the United States I will
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not ask for any revealing you know any self disclosing statements but how we
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need you personally have a bargain for something different than your co-workers
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with an employer so we have plenty of experience in their room and within the
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moment how many of you have done more than once but welcome to the world exactly running and if you haven't done
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it more than once yet you will because at bargaining leads the other word so
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here's your here's your chance to participate in the argue normal quiz that you're ready to that okay all right
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you're very normal I'm going to do well so I like to summarize a whole body of research in this little table here so
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we've looked at the impact of idiosyncratic deals on the kind of
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psychological contract people experience with their employer lots of different
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studies have done this and a couple of things that are important in the in the
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research the first is it does seem to be the case that timing matters that is
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when the employment relationship is the person bargaining for something
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different from his or her peers and for the purposes of this little discussion
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is going to make it two times so you can bargain before you're hired
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it's called sometimes an ex antipsychotic whereby ex ante ideal or mobile
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or you can bargain once you're on the job so a post of an ex post I deal so
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we're just didn't do that simple contrast for the moment so the first issue is do you think about the kinds of
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ideals that are most likely have an effect on the psychological contract to
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have an effect in strengthening the bond between the employee and the employer
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created a sense of mutual obligation and willingness to reciprocate and
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contribute that's the kind of deal I'm talking about me so here's the question
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the question is what kind of deals have
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ideals have the greatest effect on creating us a psychological contract
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before after our on the job so how many would say before you take the job those
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are the deals are really going to affect the psychological contract if you think that's true it's safe yes raise your
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hand before before and how we say no
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it's after Harry that's good all right
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and then the second thing is which of these deals are most likely to reinforce
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and create that strong bond and so look at that list of stuff on both sides this
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ability to senior management challenging project promotion awkward and a greater responsibility
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market-based pay injury special equipment vacation time to travel what
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are the kinds of things if you would bark before do you think would really build that bond you can use your words
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anybody want to nominate attendees so which of these are going to really reinforce the bond visibility market
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base pay vacation yeah okay but it's at
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the top three challenging project you guys are good so basically what this is
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a very different leaves first ex ante before hire deals don't mean to this
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point they don't have much of an effect at all because people are thinking they
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gave it to me because I'm worth it not because they're a great employer on the other hand if they give it to me once I
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on the top it's a signal about the quality of our relationship and the second thing is the stuff that matters
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are these much more intrinsically valuable features a visible visible
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senior management like a challenging word I have a promotion opportunity greater responsibility these warr I'd
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like to call them developmental ideals that you get once you're on the job are
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very valuable to people incentives increase the bond between the individual
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in the organization and the other stuff don't seem to make technical term so critical issues
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there's I cants can occur at different times the ex ante deals we've just talked about you make when you're hired
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ex post feels typically are made in the context that have a performance review
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at the end of the year with your manager and you talk about the future you know some discussions are had what a problem
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to come up during the year and you're going to talk to the boss and we really would like to have nothing expert Expos
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kind of deal and then the third kind of deals is the kind of deal that's made when somebody threatens to quit right
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the difference is one deals me during the recruiting process the others made in the context of a discussion that
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reward or needs and the last ones made under conditions of threat and the
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nature of these three deals is different tons of time to talk about the difference as we now though if you have
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an interest in that I have a paper I can share with you but the idea is the one deal that reflects relationship quality
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and the employers assessment of the employee in terms of the strength and
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value of the person is the expose performance deal it's the one with the most let's call it virtuous effects now
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here's a question for you which of these deals is most likely to upset coworkers
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how many think it's the extant paying people something different than others and giving people think different
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when you hire the ex-ante is the most upsetting not okay how many think it's
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the ex post people getting rewarded when they bargain on the job and how many
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think it's they threatening to quit do so all learners hate the third category and
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we should one of the big issues with regard to ex-post threatened to quit
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ideals is that everybody else is now compensated or paid less than the person
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who threatened to leave at least by definition it's not calibrated
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necessarily on an assessment of the relative contribution of the individuals the key issue for us is that ideals may
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have been threatening to quit doing more disloyalty not all employers warrant
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loyalty but nonetheless they suggest also that the existing reward system is
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out of line with the market if you can actually get a better deal by going somewhere else maybe the organization
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doesn't necessarily have a well-thought-out and award system broadly but the idea is also not
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necessarily the better performer or better contributor makes them thinking a
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person who's along enrollment and so it's really the kind of circumstance that should give one pause you can say
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yeah it's illegal maybe not wives however so more I'm going with this and what I'd like to
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kind of focus on with you we've been working on working towards is thinking
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about I'm just going to call the triangle of justice now a lot of
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organizations achieve fairness
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say a perception of fears in a very
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problematic fashion fairness is achieved either by enforcing standardization
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across the board we can't get anything unless to be specified by a chart or a
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cheese fair this fun but I would argue
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that there's a difference between perceptions of fairness and fundamental justice justice is not a perception it
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is a condition of the way in which rewards and opportunities and integers
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are allocated and I'm giving it a moral objectivity tight little tradition
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balancing creating justice in the organization reflects a multi-party will
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a set of relationships and balancing flexibility and fairness requires
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conditioning the ideal on us a bundle of
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practices and relationships so key idea here is I'm just gonna I often forget
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about emotional other things behind you know coming up that's us for a while whatever maybe you
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can see it in the car our research on using credit deals suggests and it
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suggests in the context of both the west and the east with so I'm saying the US
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Australia and Northern Europe as one group and the East Japan and Singapore
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and China as another very similar mechanisms very similar conditions
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appear to be related to the perception of ideals as being fair and effectively
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motivate as a function of actually relationships between the three sides of
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my justice triangle so the first issue is that employees and managers are more
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likely to be performed that the deal is fair and works well for them the item
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the eye dealer and employee and in their manager in the context where the eye Emil is managed not just
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after the bath in how both parties conduct themselves in the post
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negotiation and aftermath during the existence of the idea on the employee
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co-workers side one of the things that time and again in multiple studies we
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see that coworkers are much more accepting and possibly disposed to
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special arrangements on the part of a character when the pier is our friend
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when appears somebody they have a trusting relationship with where the
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pier is seen as somebody who has a legitimate need or I contribution of warrants the deal and where the person
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when the ideal shares there any burdens created by their ideal doesn't just
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stick the extra word on to their cues so there's a a balance and an arrangement
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of the conditions under which I've been granted the special deal and the effect
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it has on my peers but the critical aspect here is co-workers who like and
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respect that I wheeler are more accepting on that deal especially if it doesn't
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create problems for them third issue is how do people leave the manager who rent
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of the deals of Sam's other things be people trust your manager manager
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communicate openly with you much more positive responses to an ideal that if
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the managers done in the secret of the manager treats you very differently from everybody else so critical idea is
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ideals are socially complicated they probably won't even kept them secret but
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if indeed we are an environment in which is harder to effectively reward people
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in the standards dense heterogeneous needs people in very different roles
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very different kind of employment contracts we might need to become more facile at creating flexibility and
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fairness so what I'd like to last points
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and then take your question so whether ideal is likely to be seen as fair that's a nicely seen as
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it's a persistent perception hey piers first it appears have a choice
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themselves could have had an ideal that they asked Lord if they were under the same conditions same meter same
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contribution peers are more likely to think of the idea of a sphere so if I
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knew those acknowledged appears and they're aware of it and the conditions on the news easily makes it more of an
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impetus for what they have a certain
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issue there's no cost making deals that avoid negative consequences for peers the ideal if you're bargaining for hours
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or as an assignment nobody else wants great food them they'll be very happy that you have it appears aren't highly
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interdependent with their ideal so their own work is life isn't disturbed by somebody having a special arrangement
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they're much more likely to accept it when we invented this the irony appears
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benefit in some special way from a person having an ideal and that's actually an interesting event one of the
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things there are several of my colleagues have identified is the idea that when period with a person with the
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ideal shares to others how they made it so that they would learn how to make their own deal and we can see that as a
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benefit the studio another issue is when the individual is somebody that cares about
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you guys is really valuable and I have to say even in a university environment I have known certain circumstances in
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which the person who got the job offered from Harvard led to all his colleagues
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coming in to sing our Provost and say keep given what he wants you get out my lab space dramatis classes because they
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wanted to be in the university that get the star person so it was when winged
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because it would be got the bragging rights that he didn't go to Harvard he stayed with us in difference to the
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types of resources involved one of the things that's very important is the fact that not everything is valued equally by
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all people what's an interesting assignment to you might be boring to someone else what's great hours to you not so nice
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for other people and what we often find is that where people have more
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individual preferences are growing we call the particular resources neither support the mentoring Portland as
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opposed to things that have to do with goods like money and more concrete monetizing and things so the opportunity
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of bargaining the morning things actually being away of what the job becomes more valuable without
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threatening the interests of co-workers and last but not least my favorite part of this is India syncretic deals really
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do offer us an HR an opportunity to begin experimenting with alternative ways of creating supports and managing
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people and the notion that one might grant an ideal has an experiment to see
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how well it works f it has a way of generating the opportunity for innovation last one I'd
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like to sing with regard to innovation in your cigarette idiosyncratic arrangements exist in all organizations
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from the most bureaucratic to the most emerge and startup organic environment
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in innovative organic environments maybe everybody has an ideal because hey they
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probably paid anyway if you're going to start up so your hours and the nature of your work would be highly variable or
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function and that's what how we roll awaking happens and startups and that kind of ascending and ideal probably
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maybe is the normal way in which people are motivated that's very different in the most pure Craddock incentives where
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ideals are exceptions to rules that have to be granted by an authority to make
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the illusion so the level of flexibility to make a Socratic arrangements really
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does vary across organizational environment organizations are really in
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the middle where they've got some rules and practices that structure how things are done but they're increasingly is a
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broad zone of acceptance for how it works and that the hours and the delivery and
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it's in that environment where the opportunity to negotiate and craft
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experiments and new ways of doing things may be the most valuable in terms of making a working place that's more
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humane and comfortable for people as well as being effective for the
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organization but a little bit of advice before I close ideals are not
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supplements for decent pay and job security then they the president broadly
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available supports for the world employees that standardized bases of
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rewards and support still signals quality quality on a relationship but I
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heard can be supplements to them to make a job more valuable and more customized
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to the individual there are way of experimenting to see what new practices
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might work or work or not work here ideals work when ideas are good
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neighbors when the IV Hillard is required to maintain good relationships with coworkers as a function of their
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special arrangement because in effect we're trying to support collaboration
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not competition and if ideals are used as a basis for
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we'll expect that the benefits mere rumor it's important if the attracted
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the ideals when maybe because organizations need to build memory in
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order to figure out what practices work for us or don't work for us and the fact that supervisors often make them
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insecure s'ti and know you can tell of your supervisors means that the learning curve may be lower than it really needs
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to be in a hybrid road that we would see more of a rolling HR and identifying these kind of local practices that might
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be that might offer for innovative alternatives that will be effective in
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the future and last but not least don't reward this loyalty that repeat bargains
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people who keep coming back for the same payment every year or two or some status
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indicator to feel that they're better positioned than their peers I wrote their value in the firm and
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antagonized coworkers and so the role of repeat bargaining as a dysfunctional
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aspect of employment and by that I mean coming back for the same stuff over and over again it's something that really
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needs to be thought about and this is true in universities as anywhere else if
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you have to bargain to get what you need all time that says that we're falling short in
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terms of our quality of our HR practices I think of ideals is the cherry on top
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of the sundae
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[Applause] thank you in relation to an
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idiosyncratic table as opposed to the preferential treatment yeah you talks
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about positives of failure but how many co-workers do see it as infantile
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but it's that way although it's a very good question so the question is how many co-workers
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really do see a deal set up in the proper way as fear and I'm going to go back and say
39:10
first and foremost what do co-workers know what is the quality of their
39:17
relationship to the manager and the person of the ideal people who have quality relationships with the manager
39:24
and with the eye dealer who have good information are more likely to see the
39:29
deal as acceptable as basically fair so there are some preconditions and I do
39:35
think it relates to the issue that justice caves that people manage carefully the employment relationship
39:42
the idea that you would make it illegal under conditions that would that makes sense to the work group is a very
39:50
important factor some of the work I've done with us which we treat anon who's
39:56
that Illinois Institute of Technology looks at ideals in the context of or groups and we find that when people have
40:03
a low variation on their element relationship high we remember exchange
40:09
relations
40:36
individual faculty and government states
41:01
Philadelphia RC legislation to stop any discussion in that previous do so again
41:11
is this piece of worrying about too much
41:18
okay so I think the key issue is because it's a very good legitimate questions
41:25
and concerns a real concern and justice is hard work fairness is easy justice is
41:32
hard work I if you see chromatic notes cannot be a substitute for appropriately
41:41
structured compensation and performance assessment systems are not a substitute
41:46
they're a way of being more adaptive to the Bevin individuals different and the
41:53
fact that employers have incomplete information inherently on what employees might want
41:59
and policies that are universally applicable are almost impossible to
42:06
write well we don't want an organization that has so many goals that unless it's
42:12
permitted everything is forbidden but I do think the issue is that there is
42:18
benefit in the idiosyncratic deals for better timing and allocating resources
42:23
to people where people's interest in those resources dinner and that's a lot
42:30
of stuff from and a lot of that relates to development and advancement and skill
42:35
building it also relates to stress reduction and the quality of the experience at work so conditions of my
42:43
job and we're and how I'd like that individuals don't necessarily have or
42:50
perceive themselves to have autonomy over them perhaps it more of us individually
42:57
believed ourselves effective to shape our work such a situation without asking
43:02
our boss we wouldn't have to worry about some of these things but but there is a
43:08
conditioned reaction to many cases for employees not to do something unless the
43:14
wash encourages the poor supports it and so because of that lack of autonomy support you need to have an environment
43:20
in which people can have these issues raised about how to customize their work conditions but it's not a substitute for
43:27
policy and practices my colleague Linda Babcock who wrote the book women don't
43:33
ask and she says it really is wrong women women all the time we just don't like to
43:39
negotiate we like to collect problem solving so part of the issue is
43:44
expanding that conversation so that problems are addressed in a way that
43:50
employees have some voice to explore alternatives sometimes a one-month class
43:55
but I notice the question was over here I don't want to ignore you guys have fun guys we're leaning this either give it
44:00
to it very quickly obviously difference I think you made all of us raise our hands if we've had
44:06
an in this video semantic tail and almost everybody in this room has do you
44:11
not think that it's about time we made it as the ability for technology
44:20
technology to figure out its variants so
44:25
question is if shouldn't you socratic the deals would become the norm given
44:31
that so many of us cabin right if I were to go back you remember that slide I had
44:38
up with if you are gonna start out the innovative settings on everybody to have
44:43
an ideal which because it's kind of organization without a lot of policies and practices so certainly if we were
44:49
all on you know made of settings we all be bargaining a lot but some of us are in universities I guess I wouldn't call
44:55
them innovative settings some of us are in big corporations pockets of innovation a lot of other pockets not
45:01
quite so flexible I do think that the
45:07
experimentation that a person can ask or a person can explore or a challenge of
45:14
practice is increasing and in the younger generation of workers and that's
45:21
something to encourage now we won't because silent suffering is so damn painful and number two because we're
45:28
people will always know more about we will always know more about our own individual preferences and interests
45:34
than another you know about us why rely on someone else to structure
45:40
what rewards might come to us an organization's very development of more
45:46
of an idea exchange and exploration so I do think it is becoming more normative
45:54
certainly there are all models so we look at the data from Asia women are
46:00
much less likely to bargain least been in the West I thought was bad here or
46:06
someplace else yeah also there is a greater tendency in
46:12
organizations to give support to younger workers and not necess
46:18
older workers unless the older workers are highly senior so workers benefit
46:25
from being veterans but if they're older workers who have a lower tenure they're often the least advantaged which is an
46:32
interesting issue with regard to reemployment of people in organizations over time so I do think those kinds of
46:39
issues of what how do we promote it and avoid having sort of inadvertent
46:44
discrimination as a function of asking it is relation and he's like you say
46:50
you'll be trained for a healthier do fasting
46:57
[Applause]
47:02
you